counties, 2 we examine enlistment and death rates for all military personnel disaggregated by non-metropolitan status, in addition to several risk factors associated with higher death rates, namely military branch and rank within branch. The approach enables us to examine the extent to which the human costs of the Iraq War differentially impact rural communities. Non-metropolitan/metropolitan and rural/urban schemes do not perfectly align. The designations, however, do correlate with one another and we use the term non-metropolitan as a parallel to rural.
3
Disaggregated death rate of US military personnel in Iraq
Since the Iraq War began, 3,853 deaths of US troops occurred between March 20, 2003, and December 31, 2007 . Of these, 898 (23%) deaths were troops from nonmetropolitan counties. Following Buzzell and Preston, we examine the cause-specific rate of death using person-years lived as the denominator, 4 which is derived from the quarterly count of troop strengths in Iraq reported by the Department of Defense. 5 We further disaggregate the death rates by non-metro status of the reported home county for each deceased troop member. Cause-specific death rates for the Iraq troops and civilian population (age 20-34) are reported in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here]
A higher death rate is observed for the non-metro sub-population of military troops and the civilian population across all causes of death. As reflected in Buzzell and Preston's earlier work, non-combat (i.e., accidents, suicides, and homicides) and disease related deaths are higher among the US population than the military population.
The US non-metro population has higher death rates relative to the metropolitan population, especially violent deaths. Data from the National Center for Health Statistics (Eberhardt et al. 2001) show that deaths from accidents and suicides are higher among non-metro populations whereas homicides are notably higher for metro populations.
The troop data also show that military personnel from non-metro areas are at a disadvantage relative to troops from metro counties. Non-metro troops have a higher death rate than metro troops despite the lower death rate due to non-combat violence within the military population (the observed difference in deaths from disease are not statistically significant). The disparity is especially pronounced for non-combat violent deaths. So while the military population has a lower rate of death to non-combat civilian counterparts relative to the advantage observed for troops coming from metropolitan counties.
Moreover, and more pertinent to popular discussions about the imbalanced costs of war, a markedly higher combat death rate is observed for non-metro troops compared to metro troops. The total death rate for all troops in Iraq due to combat is 3.43 per 1,000 troops. Yet the combat-related death rate for non-metro troops is 4.09 per 1,000.
All causes combined, the total death rate for non-metro troops is just over 5 deaths per 1,000 troops. In contrast, the total death rate for metro troops is 4 deaths per 1,000 troops. The higher death rate for non-metro troops supports the argument that the consequences of war are disproportionately felt by non-metropolitan communities. The difference in death rates is a single person, yet the raw numeric impact of loss is greater on a non-metro community than a metro community due simply to the lower population concentration that, in part, defines non-metro communities. There are dramatic consequences for the families and friends of the deceased, regardless of community size. Yet it is reasonable to anticipate that each death has a greater impact on the wider community in non-metro areas given the numeric dynamics and, potentially, the density of kinship and social network characteristics of less urban places (Curtis White and
Guest 2003).
The general ranking of mortality by branch of service, reported in [ Table 2 about here]
Differences in the impacts of death in the Iraq War are further illustrated in Figure   1 . The number of combat deaths per county population age 20-34 is plotted for all US counties. 6 Shaded counties have suffered at least one death in Iraq; the lightest shading corresponds with counties losing the equivalent of less than .05% of its age-specific population, whereas the darkest shade highlights counties that have lost the equivalent of more than 1% of its age-specific population (the highest proportion observed was Mineral County, Colorado at 1.1%). Counties with no shading suffered no loss as of December 31, 2007. For almost all (97%) metro counties, the impact of losses in Iraq is equivalent to less than .05% of its population (age 20-34) whereas only .1% lost the equivalent of 1% of their populations. In comparison, while most non-metro counties suffering military deaths fall within the lower-impact category, 18% of non-metro counties fall within the higher-impact categories; 6% of which lost the equivalent of 1% or more of their populations. This is intuitive given the smaller population base on which military deaths are applied, yet the social and economic implications for these communities cannot be dismissed and likely are magnified by the lower population size.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Deaths in the Iraq War are not evenly distributed across US counties. The South has higher enlistment than any other region in the US (Kane 2006; Segal and Segal 2004 ), yet only counties in Texas suffered the highest relative loss. The higher-impact category is largely concentrated in the Great Plains (which includes Texas) and Upper
Midwest regions. Of the states within these regions, however, only Montana has been identified as having one of the highest numbers of recruits relative to the youth population (Kane 2006; Segal and Segal 2004) .
Understanding higher non-metro death rates
Disproportionate enlistment is often identified as a potential explanation for the non-metro communities experiencing the brunt of military deaths. It is important to note, however, that the disaggregated death rates account for uneven enlistment between non-metro and metro counties. The rates are standardized and, thus, hold the base population constant; the death rate is 5 per 1,000 for non-metro troops and 4 per 1,000
for metro troops. Still, we examine differences in enlistment according to two dimensions used in earlier research: non-metro/metro status and rural concentration.
The non-metro/metro distinction, as before, is based on census definitions. Rural concentration reflects the proportion of the county total population that resides within rural areas.
7,8
Enlistment for 2004-05 by place type is reported in Table 3 . 9 The percentage representation of recruits coming from non-metro counties is relatively consistent across the military branches and is proportionate to the US non-metro population. Non-metro enlistment is highest for the Air Force (21% of all enlistment), yet there is only a 3
percentage-point range across the branches (18% of all Navy enlistment is non-metro).
Census figures show that about 20% of the US total population is non-metro and 17% of the US population age 18-24 is rural (U.S. Census Bureau 2002) . The ratio of enlistment relative to the youth population (age 18-24), also reported in Table 3, suggests that enlistment is overrepresented among non-metro troops across all branches. The overrepresentation is especially pronounced for Army and Air Force recruits (a 22% and 23% proportional overrepresentation, respectively).
[ Table 3 about here]
The ratio of recruits to the population is unevenly distributed across the rural concentration continuum. Larger proportions of recruits come from more urban counties (especially counties with less than 10% of the population living in rural areas We disentangle the role of mortality and enlistment to further illustrate the differential impacts of mortality for non-metro troops and, in turn, their communities.
10
The estimates reported in Table 4 are calculated from data on Army deaths and enlistment between 2004 and 2007 since data was consistent for this branch and time period. Results reinforce the point that enlistment is considerably higher among nonmetro communities and that mortality is higher for troops coming from non-metro communities. The total impact of the differential deaths and enlistment is three times higher for troops coming from non-metro communities compared to troops from metro communities (.20 versus .06).
[ We examine whether a greater share of non-metro deaths are concentrated among enlisted and lower ranked troops. We disaggregate the number of deaths and calculate the proportion of deaths by rank for non-metro and metro troops. Results in Table 5 show mixed support. 12 In general, a similar pattern of mortality is observed by rank for non-metro and metro troops. Still, relative to metro troops, a greater concentration of deaths is found for non-metro troops in the Army, specifically among enlisted non-metro troops in the Army and, more specifically, Army Sergeants; 37% of all non-metro deaths are concentrated among Army Sergeants compared to 30% of all metro deaths. There is negligible difference between the proportions of total deaths among the lower ranked enlisted Army personnel. Similarly, there is little observed difference between non-metro and metro Army officers or among Marines, enlisted or officers. The differences between non-metro and metro mortality appear to be concentrated among Army Sergeants.
13
[ Table 5 about here]
We further examine mortality by calculating the relative risk of death for nonmetro troops by deployment and find additional evidence of a non-metro/metro disparity within rank. Results, also in Table 5 , show that the relative risk of mortality is generally higher for non-metro enlisted troops and lower for non-metro officers. Differences are especially pronounced among Army troops; non-metro enlisted troops have a 31%
greater risk of mortality relative to their metro counterparts. Among Army Sergeants, troops with the highest proportion of total deaths, non-metro troops have a 48% greater of deployments in a year by branch of service to the person-years lived in that branch. We adjust for changes in deployment lengths over the course of the Iraq War.
risk of dying than metro troops. Yet, among officers, non-metro troops have a 15%
lower risk of death than metro troops. The non-metro advantage increases with rank.
We examined mortality by age, race and sex and did not find any indication that these demographic factors explained the non-metropolitan/metropolitan differences.
Conclusion
The disaggregated analysis of mortality among US military troops suggests that non-metro areas are experiencing a higher cost of the Iraq War. Troops from non-metro counties have higher rates of death regardless of cause or military branch. The greatest impacts of military deaths are felt among non-metro counties, with the largest brunt experienced among counties within the Great Plains and Upper Midwest regions.
Death rates inherently adjust for differential enlistment, suggesting that nonmetro troops are at a greater risk of death after accounting for higher enlistment. This is an especially important point because enlistment receives central focus in popular accounts of differences in military deaths.
Military deaths were largely concentrated among Army personnel for non-metro and metro personnel, although a higher concentration is observed for non-metro troops, especially enlisted Army Sergeants; nearly 40% of all non-metro deaths are concentrated among this group. The relative risk of death is higher among non-metro enlisted troops and lower among non-metro officers compared to metro troops. The non-metro disadvantage in risk of death decreases with rank; rural officers appear to have an advantage over their more urban counterparts.
These data limit our ability to comment on why non-metropolitan troops experience higher death rates. Perhaps there are systematic differences in the quality of training, the riskiness of missions, or other factors that put non-metropolitan troops at greater risk of mortality compared to metropolitan troops. Results demonstrate a heightened risk is worthy of focus in future research.
As Buzzell and Preston note, death is just one of the potential outcomes of military service. Injuries, physical and psychological, are other likely consequences of war. Each outcome has important implications for the individual as well as the community to which s/he returns, including the extent to which support services are available to such personnel and her/his family (Helseth 2007a) . Indeed, some reports suggest that service providers in rural areas are not directly serving their communities because they have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan (Helseth 2007b) . This is yet another potential aspect by which the effects of war differently impact smaller communities. 
